KESSLER, J.

¶ 1 At issue in this appeal is whether the circuit court erred in denying Kelly M. Rindfleisch's motion to suppress all evidence resulting from a search warrant ordering Internet Service Providers (ISPs) Google and Yahoo to produce emails from Rindfleisch's email accounts with them from January 1, 2009, until October 10, 2010, together with the account ownership identifying data. Rindfleisch claims the warrants lacked sufficient particularity and thus were "general warrants" in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Rindfleisch was charged with four counts of misconduct in public office, in violation of WIS. STAT. § 946.12(3) (2009-10),1 based on a complaint alleging that she engaged in partisan campaign activities, including political fundraising, during working hours while she was simultaneously a Milwaukee County employee working for then-County Executive Scott Walker. The criminal complaint alleged that during her County work hours, Rindfleisch campaigned for Walker's 2010 gubernatorial campaign, along with the campaign for Lieutenant Governor Candidate Bret Davis.

¶ 3 The complaint states that Rindfleisch was hired by the County Executive's Chief of Staff, Tim Russell, as a policy advisor for the County Executive in early 2010. Rindfleisch was promoted to Deputy Chief of Staff in March 2010. As a Milwaukee County employee, Rindfleisch was issued a laptop and a County email account. According to the complaint, Rindfleisch used a "non-County issued, personal laptop computer and a non-County, private wireless Internet connection supplied by Tim Russell," to work on "projects assigned to her by Russell." Rindfleisch also had two personal email accounts: rellyk_us@yahoo.com and kmrindfleisch@gmail.com. Information found in the emails subject to the warrants showed that both of Rindfleisch's personal email accounts were used for political purposes during County work hours.

¶ 4 On August 11, 2010, Milwaukee County District Attorney Chief Investigator David Budde submitted an affidavit requesting multiple search warrants relating to political activity conducted by Darlene Wink, the Constituent Services Coordinator for Walker. The affidavit incorporated by reference both an affidavit dated May 14, 2010, in support of a petition to enlarge the scope of the John Doe proceedings2 investigating various potentially prohibited activities conducted by Walker's aides or appointees during his time as Milwaukee County Executive, and an affidavit dated July 1, 2010, "in support of a Search Warrant for the Yahoo Mail accounts of Darlene Wink." According to the August 11, 2010 affidavit, both of the incorporated affidavits tended to establish that Wink conducted partisan political activity while engaged in her official position as an employee within the Office of Milwaukee County.3

¶ 5 Shortly thereafter, the John Doe proceedings expanded to include Russell.4 On August 20, 2010, Budde submitted another affidavit, "principally to search and seize records and information in the form of digital evidence contained on computer workstations issued by Milwaukee County for Tim Russell's use." The affidavit did not refer to, or implicate, Rindfleisch. However, an exhibit to the affidavit included an email from Russell to Rindfleisch, including the email chain to which Russell's email related. The chain included various emails discussing political matters. The email addresses in the chain included Russell's email address, "JillB@scottwalker.org," Rindfleisch's Milwaukee County email account and her Google email account.5

¶ 6 Two months later, on October 20, 2010, Budde submitted another affidavit supporting a search warrant application to require emails between January 1, 2009, and October 20, 2010, from Rindfleisch's Google and Yahoo accounts, and from the email accounts for Russell, Brian Pierick, and "ScottForGov." The affidavit explained that Budde believed the email accounts would contain evidence of Russell's misconduct in public office because emails deleted from Russell's Google account may have remained in Rindfleisch's accounts. Budde explained why Rindfleisch's email accounts would probably contain evidence of Russell's misconduct:

¶ 7 The warrants issued to Google and Yahoo on October 20, 2010,6 were substantially similar. Both contained information identifying the statutory authority of the investigation (the John Doe proceeding), and the identifying email account information for the ISPs. Both warrants required:

¶ 8 The warrant issued to Google additionally included the following production request:

¶ 9 Both warrants requested the ISPs to search for evidence of the specific crimes of misconduct in public office and political solicitation involving public officials and employees. The warrants state that the search was to be "for the following evidence of crime":

Both warrants allowed the records to be delivered to the District Attorney's office.

¶ 10 The ISPs complied with the warrants by sending the District Attorney: (1) subscriber identifying information for the provided email address(es); (2) session timestamps and originating IP addresses for logins for the dates requested in the warrant; and (3) CDs containing the emails and contacts lists available to the ISP for the dates requested.9

¶ 11 On October 28, 2010, Google responded to the warrant stating: "To the extent any document provided herein contains information exceeding the scope of your request, protected from disclosure or otherwise not subject to production, if at all, we have redacted such information or removed such data fields." At oral argument, counsel for Rindfleisch stated that on November 1, 2010, the State asked to have the John Doe proceedings expanded to include Rindfleisch. Others were also included in the expanded proceedings. The State requested a search warrant for Rindfleisch's Milwaukee dwelling in West Allis and her Columbia County property. Counsel advised at oral argument that these warrants were executed, with Rindfleisch present, and her personal computer(s) seized. Her counsel also stated that the computer warrants were not being challenged and are not part of this appeal.

¶ 12 Yahoo responded on November 19, 2010, swearing in an affidavit: "Pursuant to the Federal Stored Communications Act, 18 USC §§ 2701 et. Seq., we have redacted information, including removing certain data fields, that exceeds he scope of this request, is protected from disclosure or is otherwise not subject to production."

¶ 13 On January 26, 2012, Rindfleisch was charged with four counts of misconduct in public office. The specific dates10 of the four alleged offenses were all in the Spring of 2010 (prior to the date of the warrants), and all were supported by electronic evidence. The criminal complaint includes copies of several emails between Rindfleisch and Russell, using her Google and Yahoo accounts. It also identifies multiple chat transcripts between Rindfleisch and other campaign aides. These electronic communications, along with other information in the complaint, indicate that Rindfleisch intentionally engaged in partisan political campaign activities11 during her Milwaukee County work time.

¶ 14 Rindfleisch filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the search warrants issued to Yahoo and Google. Rindfleisch argued that the warrants "purportedly permitted by ... section 968.375, Stats., eviscerates her privacy rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth amendments and correlative provisions under the Wisconsin Constitution ... [and] may well run afoul of Rindfleisch's other constitutional protections, including her rights under the First and Sixth Amendments and HIPPA (sic) laws."12 The focus of Rindfleisch's suppression argument to the circuit court was that: (1) the warrants failed to identify the objects to be seized with requisite particularity; and (2) WIS. STAT. § 968.375 is unconstitutional as applied to her case. Rindfleisch argued in her brief supporting her motion that "[t]he warrants required an unknown employee of the ISPs to produce all of their records, and then left it to law enforcement officers to sift through [her] personal, private communications to determine which of those communications actually related to the case.... The ISPs complied with the warrants. Law enforcement officers then had carte blanche to rummage through [her] personal electronic communications."

¶ 15 After briefing and a hearing, the circuit court orally denied Rindfleisch's motion, finding:

¶ 16 Rindfleisch subsequently pled guilty to one count of misconduct in public office; the State dismissed the remaining three counts. The circuit court withheld sentence and placed Rindfleisch on probation for a period of three years, imposed a six-month period of confinement with Huber release privileges in the House of Correction, and ordered her to pay costs and surcharges. This appeal is limited by WIS. STAT. § 971.31(10) to the circuit court's denial of Rindfleisch's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from Google and Yahoo.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review.

¶ 17 "On review of a motion to suppress, [an appellate] court employs a two-step analysis." State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, ¶ 16, 285 Wis.2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582. "First, we review the circuit court's findings of fact. We will uphold these findings unless they are against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence." Id. We "`will uphold findings of evidentiary or historical fact unless they are clearly erroneous.'" Id. (citation omitted). "Next, we must review independently the application of relevant constitutional principles to those facts. Such a review presents a question of law, which we review de novo, but with the benefit of [the analysis] of the circuit court." Id. (internal citation omitted).

B. Motions to Suppress Evidence.

¶ 18 When a party moves to suppress evidence based on an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, the proponent of the motion has the burden of establishing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. State v. Bruski, 2007 WI 25, ¶ 20, 299 Wis.2d 177, 727 N.W.2d 503. The burden of offering evidence at a suppression hearing has been helpfully described by Wayne R. LaFave in Search and Seizure: A Treatise On The Fourth Amendment:

See 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 11.2(b) (4th ed.2004) (footnotes omitted).

C. The Warrant Clause and General Warrants.

¶ 19 Rindfleisch argues that her Fourth Amendment rights have been violated because the warrants here are "general warrants," which "lack the level of particularity required to pass constitutional muster." Specifically, Rindfleisch asserts that:

(Emphasis added.)

(Emphasis added.) It is upon this last clause that Rindfleisch bases her entire argument. Specifically, Rindfleisch contends that the warrants at issue lacked sufficient particularity and were unconstitutional general warrants.

¶ 21 The United States Supreme Court, in Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981), explained the background and definition of a general warrant:

See id. at 220, 101 S.Ct. 1642 (internal citations omitted, emphasis added).

D. The Warrants at Issue did not Violate the Fourth Amendment's Particularity Requirements.

¶ 22 Typically, when officers exceed the scope of a search warrant, the remedy is to suppress only items seized outside the scope of the warrant. State v. Petrone, 161 Wis.2d 530, 548, 468 N.W.2d 676 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Greve, 2004 WI 69, ¶ 31 n. 7, 272 Wis.2d 444, 681 N.W.2d 479. However, if the search is conducted in "flagrant disregard" of the limitations in the warrant, all items seized — even items within the scope of the warrant — are suppressed. Petrone, 161 Wis.2d at 548, 468 N.W.2d 676. When a search is conducted with flagrant disregard for the limitations found in the warrant, the Fourth Amendment's "particularity requirement is undermined and a valid warrant is transformed into a general warrant thereby requiring suppression of all evidence seized under that warrant." United States v. Medlin, 842 F.2d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir.1988).

¶ 23 "The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Warrant Clause to be precise and clear, and as requiring only three things: (1) prior authorization by a neutral, detached [judicial officer]; (2) a demonstration upon oath or affirmation that there is probable cause to believe that evidence sought will aid in a particular conviction for a particular offense; and (3) a particularized description of the place to be searched and items to be seized." State v. Sveum, 2010 WI 92, ¶ 20, 328 Wis.2d 369, 787 N.W.2d 317 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

¶ 24 Keeping in mind the Supreme Court's definition of a general warrant and its interpretation of the Warrant Clause, we measure the warrants at issue against each requirement provided by the Warrant Clause.

1. Prior Authorization by a Neutral, Detached Judicial Officer.

¶ 25 The warrants were signed on October 3, 2010 by an experienced jurist, Reserve Judge Neal Nettesheim.13

2. Demonstration by an Oath or Affirmation that there is probable cause to believe that the evidence seized will lead to a particular conviction of a particular offense.

¶ 26 David E. Budde, the Chief Investigator assisting the John Doe Judge, swore to an affidavit in support of both the Google warrant and the Yahoo warrant. His affidavit contained numerous pages of detailed information, along with multiple exhibits.

¶ 27 The affidavit stated the warrants request related "to violations of Wisconsin Statutes § 964.12, Misconduct in Public Office, by Milwaukee County employee Timothy Russell of the Department of Health and Human Services (and formally of the Milwaukee County Executive's Office)." The affidavit explained that "county desktop computers used by Tim Russell were seized pursuant to search warrants" in this investigation, and forensic examination of those computers revealed fragments of Yahoo messages between Russell's Yahoo account and Rindfleisch's rellyk_us@yahoo.com account. In addition, emails obtained by search warrant from Russell's Google account "indicate[] that on numerous occasions, Rindfleisch forwards messages from her Milwaukee County e-mail account ... to a private e-mail account at kmrindfleisch@gmail.com. In turn, ... [Rindfleisch] sends those messages on to additional parties, including Tim Russell and persons associated with the Scott Walker campaign." The affidavit stated that "[m]any of these e-mails were sent during presumptive business days, Monday through Friday between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m." In addition, emails contained in Russell's timrussellwi@gmail.com account show he received a number of emails from Rindfleisch using rellyk_us@yahoo.com.

¶ 28 In a fact scenario similar to the case at bar, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir.2006), concluded that a search warrant to search the electronic files of Jana Reinhold passed constitutional muster. In that case, the government applied for a warrant to search Reinhold's electronic files based on her connection to Christopher Adjani. Id. at 1142. Adjani was suspected of threatening to sell confidential payment information from Paycom Billing Services. Id. at 1143. Based in part on email communications discovered between Adjani and Reinhold, both were charged with conspiring to commit extortion and transmitting a threatening communication with intent to extort. Id. at 1142. Both Adjani and Reinhold moved to suppress specific emails between them, discovered via Reinhold's personal hard drive, arguing that the warrant lacked probable cause because the warrant did not label Reinhold as a suspect. Id. at 1146-47.

¶ 29 In a decision reversing the federal district court, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the warrant stated sufficient probable cause because the warrant was only required to establish probable cause to believe that evidence of the crimes at issue could be found on Reinhold's hard drive, regardless of whether Reinhold was a suspect. Id. at 1147.14

¶ 30 Likewise, the warrant at issue in this case established, in no uncertain terms, that the State sought evidence of two particular crimes — misconduct in public office and political solicitation involving public officials and employees. The warrant requested the production of the following items, as material to this case, to establish evidence that the two particular crimes at issue were committed by Russell:

¶ 31 Like in Adjani, the warrants at issue in this case sought items based on the probable cause to believe that specific crimes were committed. The scope was limited to evidence of misconduct in public office or political solicitation involving public officials and employees, in violation of WIS. STAT. §§ 946.12, 11.36, and 11.61.

3. Particularized description of the place to be searched and the items to be seized.

¶ 32 The two ISPs, Google and Yahoo, were specifically identified by name and address. The places within their data storage system were particularly described as "For the time period of January 1, 2009, to the present, this warrant applies to information associated with the account identified [in the warrant] stored at premises owned, maintained, controlled, or operated by" the particular ISP. Rindfleisch has offered no evidence suggesting that the search exceeded the locations here described.

¶ 33 As to the items to be seized, the affidavit identified specific email accounts — four with Yahoo and two with Google — with which the warrants were concerned. Two were accounts in Russell's name: tdrussell63@yahoo.com, and trussell@yahoo.com. One account was in Pierick's name, bpierick@yahoo.com. Two of the accounts were in Rindfleisch's name: rellyk_us@yahoo.com and kmrindfleisch@gmail.com. One account, scottforgov@gmail.com, was an account that Budde believed was actually controlled by Pierick, who was also a blogger for the Walker campaign.

¶ 34 Additionally, as we have seen, information held by the ISPs which specifically identified the owner of the accounts and the personal contact information associated with the accounts, was also requested. This was necessary to ensure that the accounts were not actually owned or controlled by someone other than the suspected owner.

¶ 35 Rindfleisch has offered no evidence suggesting that information beyond those requests was produced.

E. The ISPs returned their Electronic Information with an Oath or Affirmation that the Records Produced Complied with the Warrant.

¶ 36 As noted, when Google responded to the warrant, it stated:

When Yahoo produced its records, it swore in an affidavit that:

¶ 37 The Dissent relies on United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 134-135 (2d Cir. 2014), for the well-established general proposition that "The government is barred from accessing data not within the scope of the search warrant." See Dissent, ¶ 44. In Ganias, federal agents made forensic mirror images of Stavros Ganias's hard drives. Id. at 128-29. The record in Ganias included findings that the agents knew they could not have access to the information on the hard drive image not covered by the warrant, and that they carefully separated the covered information from that not covered. Id. at 137-38. However, instead of returning the information from the hard drive image not covered by the warrant, the government kept it. Id. at 138. Three years later, another government agency used the improperly retained hard drive image to bring charges against the defendant. Id. at 130. Predictably, that did not sit well with the court, which noted extensive facts in the record amounting to obvious government misconduct. Id. at 137-40. The record before this court permits no such findings. The ISPs asserted that they had complied with the warrant, and even that they had redacted information from their productions. Rindfleisch has not produced a shred of evidence to dispute those representations, has rejected the opportunity before this court to identify specific documents that she claimed were beyond the scope of the warrant, and has relied instead on rhetorical salvos attacking the entire scope of the warrants.

F. More is not required here by the Fourth Amendment simply because the Evidence seized is Electronic Data.

¶ 38 Rindfleisch urges this court to adopt the protocol described in In the Matter of the United States Of America's Application For A Search Warrant To Seize And Search Electronic Devices From Edward Cunnius, 770 F.Supp.2d 1138 (W.D.Wash.2011),15 a memorandum order by a federal magistrate judge. In that case, Edward Cunnius was suspected of selling counterfeit Microsoft technology. Id. at 1139. The government applied for a search warrant to search, among other things, all of Cunnius's electronically stored information. Id. at 1139-1140. The magistrate judge found the requested warrant overbroad because the warrant made no reference to the use of a filtering agent to sort through all of the electronic evidence. Id. at 1141.

¶ 39 Rindfleisch argues, based on Cunnius, that the Fourth Amendment, as applied to electronic communications, should be read to require an extra layer of protection not historically accorded paper documents, namely an electronic "filter" (the details of which she does not specify) to keep her "personal" or "private" material from being disclosed. She has identified no specific "personal" or "private" material that has been improperly produced. Alternatively, still based on Cunnius, she suggests that a third party should have been appointed by the warrant-issuing judge to review what Google and Yahoo produced. That third person would be the arbiter of what, within the data produced, would be available to the government. We are not persuaded.

¶ 40 The Fourth Amendment parameters of search and seizure law, largely developed in the context of obtaining tangible evidence, are not necessarily inapplicable to all searches for and seizures of electronic information. For example, a search warrant for a filing cabinet, located in a particular place, which contains a year's worth of correspondence between, or relating to, two particular individuals, would normally be searched where the filing cabinet is located by the officers executing the warrant. Likewise, many documents in that filing cabinet would have nothing to do with either of those individuals. The only way the officer could distinguish between what relates to either of those individuals and what does not, is to look through all of the documents in the filing cabinet. Law enforcement officers have long had to separate the documents as to which seizure was authorized from the other documents. So far, as we have been able to discover, that necessity has not turned an otherwise valid warrant into a "general" warrant. We see no constitutional imperative that would change the result simply because the object of the search is electronic data from a specific electronic file, for a reasonably specific period of time, in the custody of a specific ISP.

¶ 41 Further, in this case, both ISPs stated in writing essentially the same thing: that they provided only what was required by the warrant, and they removed electronic data beyond the scope of the warrant. Rindfleisch had the opportunity before the circuit court to identify specifically what evidence she believed was improperly seized. She elected not to do so, and instead argued that the warrant on its face did not satisfy the Fourth Amendment.16

CONCLUSION

¶ 42 Rindfleisch has failed to present any evidence at any time during these proceedings that tends to suggest that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the seizure authorized in these warrants. We have concluded that the State established, as the circuit court found, that the warrants in question were based on probable cause established by affidavit, were authorized by a judge, and particularly described the place to be searched and items to be seized. We therefore conclude, as did the circuit court, that the warrants at issue satisfy all of the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. We further find no evidence in this record suggesting in any way that the ISPs provided information beyond the scope of the warrant, much less that the information produced was in flagrant disregard of the scope of the warrant. Consequently, the circuit court's refusal to suppress everything obtained by the State from the ISPs was properly denied.

Judgment affirmed.

FINE, J. dissenting.

¶ 43 The essence of our country is "that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 180, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). (Emphasis in original.) Simply put, we are governed by our Constitution, not expediency.

A. Search.

¶ 44 We are bound by the Fourth Amendment:

Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987) (quoted sources and footnote omitted). Yet, the Majority eschews the Fourth Amendment's command and permits the government to rummage through Kelly Rindfleisch's digital files for evidence of her crime even though the search warrants sought evidence in those files of another's crime by another person (Tim Russell) and lacked probable cause to believe that Rindfleisch's digital files had any evidence of any crime that Rindfleisch might have committed. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) (The Framers were "concern[ed] about giving police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person's private effects.") (footnote omitted).

United States. v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 134-135 (2d Cir.2014) (emphasis added, quoted sources and citations omitted; ellipses in Ganias) (The government is barred from accessing data not within the scope of the search warrant.). Contrary to this enshrined Fourth-Amendment law, the search warrants for Rindfleisch's digital files did not:

The danger in this type of case is palpable:

United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 447 (2d Cir.2013) (quoted sources omitted; second set of brackets in Galpin). Rindfleisch's lawyer told us at oral argument that of the approximately 16,000 documents received from the Rindfleisch email accounts pursuant to the search warrants "there were probably" fewer "than 500 pieces of paper that had Kelly Rindfleisch's political involvement in them." The State thus hardly "inadvertently" stumbled on the ream of pages that led to Rindfleisch's charges. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469-470, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (The "plain view" doctrine does not apply to the government's discovery of implicating material that is not covered by a search warrant if the discovery was not "inadvertent.").

¶ 45 The Fourth Amendment prohibits the government to legitimately go into a person's voluminous files looking for evidence that someone else may have violated the law (here, Russell, the search warrants' object), and then root around those voluminous files to see if the subpoenas' subject (here Rindfleisch) may have also violated the law. Yet, the State admits in its brief that it did precisely that: "As the warrants and supporting affidavit make clear, however, the John Doe investigation had targeted Tim Russell, not Rindfleisch, and the warrants sought Rindfleisch's communications for the purpose of filling gaps in Russell's e-mail communications." Also, the State was asked at oral argument:

(Formatting modified.) The search of Rindfleisch's voluminous digital files was illegal because the search warrants were silent as to whether there was probable cause to believe that she was culpable.

B. Suppression.

Ganias, 755 F.3d at 136-137 (quoted sources and citations omitted, brackets and ellipses in Ganias). Here, the exclusionary rule thus applies because: (1) the State both widely and knowingly exceeded the scope of the Rindfleisch search warrants that sought only the Russell emails, and (2) the State did not objectively act in good faith based on Fourth-Amendment law that was clear at the time of the search.

C. Conclusion.

¶ 46 The Majority legitimizes a general warrant and nullifies our Constitution. I respectfully dissent and would grant Rindfleisch's motion to suppress the data provided pursuant to the search warrants that concerned Rindfleisch and not Russell. See State v. Petrone, 161 Wis.2d 530, 548, 468 N.W.2d 676, 682-683 (1991) ("The general rule is that items seized within the scope of the warrant [here, relating to Russell] need not be suppressed simply because other items outside the scope of the warrant [here, relating to Rindfleisch] also were seized, unless the entire search was conducted in `flagrant disregard for the limitations' of the warrant.") (footnotes omitted, brackets supplied).